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The Burger Court and Prosecutorial
Misconduct
By Bennett l. Gershman·
Professor Gershman critically examines a series of recenl Sufpreme Court decisions de{lling wilh prosecutorial misconduct. In
~ach case , the Court reversed the lower courl and reinslated the
?conviclion.
;.> There are a broad range of issues involved; from suppression of
f~vidence 10 trial misconduct. As a former proseculor in New York
ICity, the author is forced 10 conclude thaI, "Proseclltorial miscoll'ouct occurs because il works and because sanctions for misbehavior
'are virtually nonexistent. "

:Much of the debate surrounding the Burger Court's criminal
~ustice jurisprudence has focused on its Fourth and Fifth
fimendment decisions and the extent to which they loosen some
~fthe due process restrictions imposed on police conduct by the
[Warren Court. But commentators have largely overlooked the
~llfger Court's treatment of an area in criminal justice that is
' ~y~n more malignant and unchecked than police misconduct:
ib'use of power by prosecutors .
~;' The prosecutor is the dominant figure in the U.S. criminal
ddstice system. The prosecutor decides whether to bring crimi~iilil charges; whom to charge; what charges to bring; whether a
)\ieCendant will stand trial, plead guilty, or enter a correctional
~program in lieu of criminal charges; and whether to confer
~:,:,

\.".
,,';.,
~L~:._* Professor of Law, Pace University School of Law. The author's book on

,'PrO,eculorial Mi,conduct has recently been published by Clark Boardman and is
);relficwed in this issue of Criminal Law Bulletin.
;;:L:·-As this article went to press, the Supreme Court decided another case of pros·
;.Icutorial misconduct which involved highly improper arguments to Ihe jury. The
'4ecision in United Slales v. Young, _ U.S. _ (Feb. 20, 1985), strikingly reinforces
~_~_~e of the central theses of this article: the Supreme Court's undue tolerance of
~prosecutorial transgressions at the expense of the defendant's right to a fair trial. In
: ~oung. the Court of Appeals for the Tenlh Circuit reversed a mail fraud conviction,
;~_lding that the prosecutor's remarks during summation, although not objected to.
~alIegedly in response to defense counsel's summation, constituted "plain error"
.Under Rule 52(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and denied the defen~dant a fair trial. Reversing the Tenth Circuit, the Supreme Court agreed that the
prosecutor's conduct was improper but nevertheless ruled 5·4 that the misconduct
)"as nol sufficiently prejudicial in view of the strength of the government's case and
,~efense counsel's failure to object to the offending remarks.
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immunity from prosecution . In short, the prosecutor holds the
power to make decisions that control and even de stroy people's
careers , reputations, and lives. Long ago , the Supreme Court
wrote what has become the classic statement of the prosecutor' s role:
The United States Attorney is the rep resentative not of an ordinary
party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern
impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose
interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a
case, but that justice shall be done. As such , he is in a peculiar and very
definite sense the servant of the law, the twofold aim of which is that
guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer. He may prosecute with earnestness and vigor-indeed, he should do so. But , while he may strike
hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much his duty
to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful
conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring about a just
one, 1

This practical and ethical obligation was put to the test in a
series of decisions of the Burger Court during the past three
terms. In each case, an appellate court reversed a conviction on
grounds of prosecutorial misconduct, and in each case the Supreme Court reversed the lower court and reinstated the conviction. Apart from their crucial holdings, these decisions have a
darker significance. They evince a consistent, unyielding philosophy of judicial permissiveness toward prosecutorial excesses. The emerging themes are unmistakable: (1) an undue deference to the executive branch; (2) curtailment of the federal
courts' supervisory power to discipline and deter prosecutorial
misconduct; (3) imposition of procedural rules rendering proof
of misconduct virtually impossible ; and (4) refusal to articulate
or even require ethical standards of prosecutors. When juxtaposed with recent pronouncements of the Court that have
tolerated other instances of outrageous government misbehavior,' these decisions have the further unwholesome effect of
encouraging prosecutorial overreaching. If one were keeping a
box score of the Burger Court, the tally would read:

I

Burger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1 935).

, United State s v. Morrison , 449 U .S. 361 (1981) (violation of Sixth Amendment
rights); United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727 (1980) (violation of Fourth Amendment rights); Hampton v. United States . 425 U .S. 484 (1 976) (entrapme nt ).
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Foul Blows-7
Fair Play-O
The decisions cover a broad range of procedural issues.
Smith v. Phillips,' United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal: and
California v. Trombetta ' are concerned with the prosecutor' s
suppression of evidence; United States v. Hasting' with foren'. sic misconduct; Mabry v. Johnson' with breach of a plea bargain ; United States y. Goodwin ' with vindictiveness in charging
crime ; and Oregon v. Kennedy' with trial misconduct that
provokes a mistrial. In each case, the lower court found that the
prosecutor engaged in blatant or otherwise improper behavior
prejudicing the defendant's right to a fair trial.
Suppression of Evidence

In the landmark case of Brady v. Maryland, 1O the Warren
Court held that due process was violated when a prosecutor
secreted material evidence favorable to the defendant. The reports are filled with reprehensible examples of prosecutorial
suppression of exculpatory evidence. The Burger Court, although adhering to the Brady doctrine in principle," has
confined its application to only the most self-evident violations . This area is an outstanding example of the Court's insensitivity to prosecutorial misconduct and the right of defendants
to a fair trial.
In Smith v. Phillips, for instance, the prosecutor learned
during a murder trial that one of the jurors was vigorously
seeking employment as an investigator with the same prosecutor's office . The prosecutor suppressed this information
3455 U.S. 209 (1982).
, 458 U.S. 8585 (1982).
, 104 S. Ct. 2528 (1984).
, 103 S. Ct. 1974 (1983 ).
, 104 S. Ct. 2543 (1984).
• 457 U.S . 368 (1982).
• 456 U.S. 667 (1982).
" 373 U.S. 83 (1963) .
See United Slates v. Agurs, 427 U .S. 97 (1976); Moore v. Illinois , 408 U.S. 786
(1972); Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972).
II
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until after the jury con victed the defendant. The Second Circuit
on a petition for habeas corpus, found that due process had
been violated and vacated the conviction." The Supreme
Court, per Justice Rehnquist, disagreed. First, since there was
no showing of" actual bias" by the juror-the standard requiTed
by the Court-the lower court's finding of "implied bias" was
irrelevant. Second, although the prosecutor's conduct was "not
condoned," there was no showing that the defendant was prejudiced by the nondisclosure. Ethical standards may be overlooked, said the Court, because the "touchstone of due process
analysis is the fairness of the trial, not the culpability of the
prosecutor." The Court finally admonished tribunals not to Use
their authority to correct prosecutorial misbehavior in state
courts absent a specific constitutional violation.
Another variation of the Brady doctrine occurred in United
States v. Valenzuela-Bernal. Here the prosecutor ordered the
deportation of illegal-alien eyewitnesses to the defendant's
crime before they would be interviewed by defense counsel.
The Ninth Circuit reversed the conviction, finding that the
prosecutor's conduct deprived the defendant of his Fifth
Amendment due process and Sixth Amendment compulsory
process rights to obtain material and relevant evidence to prove
his innocence." The Supreme Court, per Justice Rehnquist,
reversed. The lower court "misapprehended the varied nature
of the duties of the Executive Branch." The prompt deportation
of illegal aliens is an overriding duty to which the Court will
defer absent a "plausible showing" that the lost evidence would
be material and favorable to the defense. Of course, as the
dissent pointed out, showing the importance of evidence without an opportunity to examine that evidence can be exceedingly
difficult.
Finally, in California v. Trombetta, the Court addressed for
the first time a Brady issue that had divided lower courts: the
prosecutor's responsibility to preserve favorable evidence for
the defendant's later use. In Trombetta, law enforcement
officials destroyed breath samples taken from the defendant and
used in his prosecution for intoxicated driving. The California
appeals court reversed the conviction, finding that the failure to
" 632 F.2d 1019 (2d Cir. 1980).
" 647 F.2d 72 (9th Cir. 1981).
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preserve vital evidence used against the defendant violates due
process.14 The Supreme Court disagreed. Although a duty to
preserve evidence was not entirely ruled out, "that duty must
be limited to evidence that might be expected to play a significant role in the suspect's defense. " To meet this standard of
materiality, the evidence must possess an exculpatory quality
that was apparent before the evidence was destroyed and be of
such nature that the defendant would be unable to obtain comparable evidence. Neither of these tests was met, according to
the Court.
Forensic Misconduct

The prosecutor's abuse and disregard of forensic propriety
is a familiar complaint. Dean Roscoe Pound observed more than
fifty years ago that such misconduct "threatened to become
staple in U .S.prosecutions. "IS Today, virtually every federal
and state court has bemoaned the " disturbing frequency" and
"unheeded condemnations" of flagrant and unethical prosecutorial behavior. ,. The failure of courts to deal firmly with
such misconduct, Judge Jerome Frank warned, encourages
prosecutorial excesses and "breeds a deplorably cynical attitude towards the judiciary." 17 Apart from occasional ceremonial
language, the Burger Court has defaulted in this area as well. In
United States v. Hasting , the Court's most recent decision
addressing forensic misconduct, the Seventh Circuit reversed a
kidnapping conviction because during summation the pros" 142 Cal. App. 3d 138, 190 Cal. Rptr. 319 (1983).
15

R. Pound, Criminal Ju stice in America 187 (1930).

" See, e.g., United Slates v. Maccini, 721 F.2d 840, 846 (1st Cir. 1983) ("reprehensible . .. disregard to our directives"); United States v. Modica, 663 F.2d 1173,
1174, 1183 (2d Cir. 1981) ("frustration" at " unheeded condemnations"); United
States v. Rodriguez, 627 F.2d 110, 112 (7th Cir. 1980) (" problem continues to arise
with disturbing frequency throughout this circuit des pite the admonition of trial
judges and this court"); Eberhardt v. Bordenkircher, 605 F.2d 275, 280 (6th Cir.
1979) (court repeatedly condemns unethical activity of prosecutors); United States v,
Agee, 597 F.2d 350, 371 (3d Cir.) (repeated warnings to prosecutors becoming
familiar routine), cerro denied. 442 U.S. 944 (1979); United States v. Morris, 568 F .2d
396, 401 (5th Cir. 1978) ("continuing problem" of prosecutorial misconduct). The
state appellate courts express similar frustration . See People v. Biondo, 16 Mich.
App. 166, 157,256 N.W.2d 60, 61 (1977).
" United States V. Antonelli Fireworks Co., 155 F .2d 631, 661 (2d Cir. 1946)
(dissenting opinion).
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ecutor repeatedly commented on the defendants' failure to testify in violation of their Fifth Amendment rights under Griffin v.
California. 18 Because prosecutors in that circuit consistently
defied the court's repeated admonitions against such improper
remarks, the court used its supervisory powers to discipline the
prosecutor and deter future similar misconduct. I' The Supreme
Court reversed. In its zeal to chastise prosecutorial overreaching, the Chief Justice wrote, the circuit court ignored the harmless error doctrine . Since no trial is error-free, the harmless
error doctrine protects society'S and the victim's interest in
preserving convictions of guilty defendants. Here the forensic
impropriety was harmless, the Court concluded. Punishment of
errant prosecutors may be accomplished by other procedures
but not by reversal.
Plea Bargaining

Since guilty pleas account for over 90 percent of all criminal
convictions, their regulation by the courts is essential to the fair
administration of criminal justice. The Supreme Court has
legitimized plea bargaining and even authorized the prosecutor's use of extremely coercive tactics to force a plea. 2 • In
this twilight zone of criminal justice, the prosecutor's virtually
unfettered power can deny fundamental fairness . A good illustration is Mabry v. Johnson. There the prosecutor offered a plea
bargain which the defendant accepted, only to be told later that
the prosecutor "made a mistake" and was withdrawing his
offer. The Eighth Circuit, in accord with other circuits, granted
the defendant's petition for habeas corpus following his conviction, finding that fairness precluded the prosecutor's reneging
on a plea proposal once it was accepted by the defendant. 21 The
Supreme Court reversed, holding that the guilty plea implicates
the Constitution; the bargain is merely an "executory agreement" which, until embodied in the formal plea, does not deprive an accused of any constitutionally protected interest.

I' 380 U.S.

609 (1965).

" 660 F.2d 301 (7lh Cir. 198 1).
20 Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U .S. 357 (1978); Parker v. North Carolina, 397
U.S. 790 (1970).

" 707 F.2d 323 (81h Cir. 1983).
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. "The Due Process Clause is not a code of ethics for prosecutors," said the Court in upholding the prosecutor's conduct.
Vindictive Charging

The prosecutor's vast power to charge crime is modestly
limited by the doctrine of vindictiveness. Invoked for the first
time by the Warren Court to remedy retaliatory sentences by
judges on due process grounds," the doctrine was extended to
prosecutors who increased charges after defendants exercised
constitutional or statutory rights.23 The procedural contexts in
which prosecutors have retaliated vary. Several courts invoked
a presumption of vindictiveness when it reasonably appeared
from the procedural setting and circumstances that the prosecutor was acting with a retaliatory motive. 24 Thus in United
States v. Goodwin the Fourth Circuit reversed the conviction
because the prosecutor increased assault charges from a misdemeanor to a felony after the defendant refused to plead
guilty.25 Although no actual vindictiveness was found, the court
applied a presumption, placing the burden on the prosecutor to
show by objective reasons that the increased charges could not
have been brought before the defendant exercised his rights.
The Supreme Court reversed. The Court once again adopted
the prosecutor's position, refusing to assume that prosecutors
might seek to penalize or deter a defendant's exercise of rights.
Particularly in the pretrial setting, said the Court, a prosecutor
should remain free to exercise his broad discretion and not be
bound by his previous conduct. The broad language of the
decision, however, seems to extend well beyond the pretrial
period. The prosecutor's charging decision, said the Court in
conclusion, is "presumptively lawful," and a defendant can
rebut that presumption only by proving objectively that the
prosecutor was vindictively motivated.

" North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969).
23

Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 20 (1974).

24 United States v. Motley, 665 F.2d 186 (9th Cir. 1981); United States v. Jamison, 505 F.2d 407 (D.C. Cir. 1974); United States v. Lippi, 435 F. Supp. 808 (D.N.J.
1977).

" 637 F.2d 250 (4th Cir. 1981).
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Trial Misconduct

Prosecutorial misconduct during trial often is pervasive and
persistent. Such conduct can include presenting inflammatory
or otherwise inadmissible evidence, refusing to heed the court's
admonishments, admitting false evidence, and insinuating guilt
by attacking the defendant's character. When the conduct becomes egregious, a mistrial may be declared on the defendant's
demand. In ·such cases, some courts have invoked the double
jeopardy clause to bar retrial on the ground that the prosecutor's behavior literally deprived the defendant of his chosen
jury, thereby forcing him to be twice placed in jeopardy. Two
standards have been applied to determine whether double
jeopardy should be invoked. First, some courts looked to the
extent and seriousness of the prosecutor's misconduct and
barred retrial when such conduct constituted " overreaching" or
"harassment" that deprived the defendant of a fair trial. The
second test barred retrial only when the prosecutor's misconduct was specifically intended to provoke a mistrial. In Oregon
v. Kennedy a state prosecutor during trial asked a highly improper question insinuating that the defendant had a prior criminal record. A mistrial was declared at the defendant's request ,
and retrial was barred under double jeopardy because the conduct was found sufficiently overreaching and prejudicial. 26 The
Supreme Court , in reversing, adopted the more restrictive standard requiring proof that the prosecutor's actions were specifically intended to goad the defendant into seeking a mistrial. The
more stringent standard was chosen because the more liberal
test was considered too " amorphous" and .. standardless." In
criticizing the majority' s choice, several members of the Court
suggested that proving that the prosecutor's motive was to
provoke a mistrial, instead of simply trying to prejudice the
defendant generally, is .. almost inconceivable ."
Breeding Cynicism and Encouraging Disrespect

Prosecutorial misconduct occurs because it works and because sanctions for misbehavior are virtually nonexistent. If
effective sanctions did exist , prosecutors would be less tempted
to indulge in some of the practices described above. The num26

49 Or. App. 415 , 619 P .2d 948 (1980 ).
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Lber of prosecutors held in contempt, disciplined by bar association grievance committees, or sued civilly is astonishingly low.
Although the major responsibility for controlling prosecu:: torial excesses rests on the judiciary, many courts, and most
notably the Supreme Court, have defaulted and have abdicated
much of their power to the executive branch and its prosecutorial agents. Time and again the Supreme Court has deferred to
. the prosecutor's conduct, judgment, and exercise of discretion.
The presumption of prosecutorial good faith echoes throughout
• specific constitutional right has been
the decisions. When no
implicated, as in Valen zuela-Bernal, the deference is total. The
Court could have preserved its independence in that case simply by requiring the prosecutor to elect which of the two overriding policies to pursue-deportation or criminal prosecution .
Instead, the Court gave the prosecutor the entire loaf, but at the
cost of denying the defendant a fair trial.
The Court also has undermined the efforts of lower courts to
control prosecutorial excesses through use of the supervisory
power doctrine. Although this doctrine has been invoked sparingly, the Court has reprimanded such attempts to discipline
errant government officials as an improvident exercise by the
judiciary of a "chancellor's foot veto over law enforcement
practices of which [a court) does not approve. " 27 Such a
response is most regrettable in a case like United Slales v.
Hasting; first, because the circuit court of appeals used its
disciplinary powers properly and only after repeated admonitions to prosecutors were flaunted; and second, because the
Supreme Court elevated the harmless error doctrine to a level
that all but dwarfed the interests of a fair trial. Such blinking at
misconduct truly breeds cynicism and disrespect.
By the same token, the Court's fashioning of procedural
rules governing proof of misconduct has been unrealistic and at
times absurd. Requiring proof, as in Oregon v. Kennedy, that a
prosecutor engaged in trial misconduct with the specific intent
to cause a mistrial is practically impossible, short of an outright
admission. Equally unrealistic is proving a juror's actual bias
(Smith v. Phillips) ; a prosecutor' s actual vindictiveness (United
States v. Goodwin); the probative value of absent eyewitnesses
(United States v. Valenzuela-Benal); or of other lost evidence
27

United States v. Russell, 411 U.S . 423,435 (1973).
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(Trombetta v. California). When misconduct is insulated frOIll
attack, there is no incentive to discontinue the practice.
Conclusion

Most troubling of all, however, is the Court 's failure to
articulate ethical norms to guide prosecutors. The theme too
often heard is that the due process clause is not a code of ethics
for prosecutors and that prejudice to the defendant, not the
culpability of the prosecutor, is the touchstone concern. This
philosophy is intolerable. First, it offers no guideposts from the
highest court in the nation to the most powerful official in the
criminal justice system on the ethical limits of conduct. Second,
it invites the prosecutor to be a law unto himself, as long as no
specific constitutional rights are violated and the prejudice is
kept to a moderate level, or even raised to an immoderate level
if the proof of guilt is strong enough to render misconduct
"harmless. "
In policing prosecutorial misconduct, then, the Burger Court
has been a friendly traffic cop which has given the prosecutor
the green light almost all of the time. If prosecutors cannot
restrain themselves and resist the temptation to misconduct,
victims of misconduct will find no ally in the Supreme Court.
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